Showing posts with label Wulf Anson. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Wulf Anson. Show all posts

Saturday, December 9, 2017

Haggis You Say? Haggis Laddy? Master Butcher Says It's Not Even Scots. A 'Present' From The Vikings.

Wulf Anson

[Shameless Self Promotion Interlude/Download Our Books Free]

Iceland Magazine
Good God!
 
If Vikings were eating Haggis too they were even tougher than we suspected after 30 years of reading every scrap of the original Sagas, Shorter Tales, and Fragments of Old Poems we could get our hands on!



Icelandic “Slátur” A Scottish butcher argues the Scottish national dish, Haggis, was originally brought to Scotland by Vikings, making it a descendant of the Viking delicacy still eaten in Iceland, slátur. Photo/Arnþór Birkisson.


A Scottish butcher who has spent the past few years researching Haggis recipes argues it dates back to the Viking invaders of the British Isles the UK newspaper The Telegraph reports. The paper argues the research of award-winning Scottish butcher Joe Callaghan, who has spent the last three years studying haggis shows “Scotland’s national dish is an ‘imposter’… invented by Vikings”. Callaghan also argues the original Scottish ingredient is deer, not sheep.

The "national dish of Scotand", invented by Vikings
Haggis is a dish very similar to the Icelandic delicacy slátur: A sausage made by stuffing a sheep's stomach with diced innards of sheep, liver as well as lungs and heart, mixed with a oatmeal, onion, pieces of sheep suet (solid white fat) as well as seasoning. Haggis is considered the “national dish” of Scotland, occupying an important place in Scottish culture and national identity.

Read more: Food of the Vikings: How to make authentic Icelandic delicacy Slátur (Slaughter)

The origins of Haggis are not definitely known, but many scots have assumed it must be of Scottish origin. The oldest known recipe of Haggis dates to around 1430, a cookbook published in Lancashire, Liber Cure Cocorum, which mentions “hagws of a schepe”. But the inhabitants of Lancashire, and of course Scotland, originally learned to cook Haggis from the Vikings who invaded, conquered and colonized large parts of the British isles in the 9th and 10th centuries.

Haggis simply means minced meat
The Telegraph points out several noted food writers and chefs have argued haggis is most likely Norse in origin. Among the proof is the argument that the word haggis actually comes from the Old Norse word haggw, which means to hack into pieces. The modern Icelandic noun hakk, which means something which has been minced (used for minced meat, for example), and the verb "höggva" are derived from the same root.

Read more: The Vikings left their mark on the European map: Here is our guide to help you find them

“Scotland’s national dish, as it is widely known, is an imposter. The real national dish is staggis, and always has been,” The Telegraph quotes Callaghan, who has developed a deer-based haggis recipe he calls “staggis”: “Deer is an indigenous species in Scotland,” he said. “The Vikings brought haggis to Scotland, we are sure of this. My recipe is based on the original Viking recipe, made with venison plucks, which I have tweaked a bit so it’s unique to me."


Scotland's National Dish Is An Imposter And Was Invented By Vikings, Claims Master Butcher  



As if the Lutefisk weren't enough!


In the Scandinavian Nations of Wisconsin and Minnesota to this very day the utterly fearless inhabitants engage in a ritual designed to prove to themselves and the world that they are still through and through, Viking Tough. And the keyword is 'Through'. 


That ritual is the Eating of the Lutefisk, though it might as aptly be known as the Running of the Lutefisk and is recommended to be trialed in a facility with at least two, and depending on the size of the party the more the better, working bathrooms. 


Lutefisk has been popularized as Cod Soaked in Plutonium, and a Weapon of Mass Destruction which "Tastes Like Python", (though where and how Vikings of a thousand years ago procured and refined Plutonium remains one of those mysteries archeologists may never unravel, kind of like discovering the owner's manual detailing the exact reconstruction blueprints that were supposed to be in the glove boxes of previously excavated Viking Longships).


Salted Cod, air dried to a pungency to run off stray dogs and rabid skunks, is then soaked in water, then soaked in lye, yes, drain cleaner, and soaked in water again to stave off its immediate lethality in trade for an intestinal cleansing of a thoroughness which modern laxatives have yet to achieve.


So just how caustic is Lutefisk? Instructions for cooking and eating Lutefisk warn in no uncertain terms that stainless steel utensils should be used because Lutefisk will ruin your sterling silver.


The Wikipedia Entry claims that the first recorded mention of Lutefisk doesn't appear until the year 1540 in a letter to Swedish King Gustav the 1st, while others try to blame its invention on the people of the Netherlands. If the Dutch invented Lutefisk why are the Wisconsiners, Minnesotans, Norwegians and Swedes the ones still keeping its ordeal alive, and giving their drains an annual scouring with it? 


If the Dutch were actually tough enough to survive Inventing and Running the Lutefisk gantlet, how come it was the Scandahoovians who beat them to discovering and conquering Wisconsin? 


Ya, You Betcha!




Here's a chant, of sorts, commemorating the Christmas Lutefisk from,


Old Lutheran, Center For Lutheran Pride (but not too proud)


Lutefisk Lament

Charlie Boone & Roger Erickson

'Twas the night before Christmas with things all a bustle
As Mama got set for the Christmas Eve tussle.
Aunts, uncles and cousins would soon be arriving
With stomachs all ready for Christmas Eve dining.
While I sat alone with a feeling of dread,
As visions of lutefisk danced in my head.
The thought of the smell made my eyeballs start burning.
The thought of the taste set my stomach to churning.
For I'm one of those who good Swedes rebuff:
A Scandahoovian boy who can't stand the stuff.

Each year, however, I played at the game
to spare mama and papa the undying shame.
I must bear up bravely, I can't take the risk of relatives knowing I hate lutefisk.
I know they would spurn me, my presents withhold,
if the unthinkable, unspeakable truth they were told.
Then out in the yard I heard such a clatter,
I jumped up to see what was the matter.
There in the snow, all in a jumble,
three of my uncles had taken a tumble.

My aunts, as usual, gave them "what for",
and soon they were up and through the door.
Then with talk, and more cheer,
an hour was passed as Mama finished the Christmas repast.
From out in the kitchen an odor came stealing,
that fairly set my senses to reeling.
The smell of lutefisk creeped down the hall
and wilted a plant in a pot on the wall.
The others reacted as though they were smitten,
while the aroma laid low my small helpless kitten.
Uncles Oscar and Lars said, "Oh, that smells yummy,"
and Kermit's eyes glittered while he patted his tummy.

The scent skipped off the ceiling and bounced off the door,
and the bird in the cuckoo clock fell on the floor.
Mama announced dinner by ringing a bell.
They pushed to the table with a yump and a yell.
I lifted my eyes to heaven and sighed,
and a rose on the wallpaper withered and died.
With wooden legs I found my chair
and sat in silence with an unseeing stare.
Most of the food was already in place;
there remained only to fill the lutefisks space.
Then Mama came proudly with a bowl on a trivet.
You would have thought the crown jewels were in it.

She placed it carefully down and took her seat,
and Papa said Grace before we could eat.
It seemed to me, with my whirling head,
the shortest prayer he ever had said.
Then Mama lifted the cover on the steaming dish,
and I was face to face with the quivering fish.
"Me first," I heard Uncle Kermit call,
while I watched the paint peel off the wall.

The plates were passed for Papa to fill.
I waited in agony between fever and chill.
He would dip in the spoon and hold it up high.
As it oozed on the plates, I thought I would die.
Then came my plate, and to my feverish brain
there seemed enough lutefisk to derail a train.
It looked like a mountain of congealing glue:
oddly transparent, yet discolored, the hue.
With butter and cream sauce I tried to conceal it;
I salted and peppered, but the smell still revealed it.
I drummed up my courage, I tried to be bold.
Mama reminds me, "Eat, before it gets cold."

I decided to face it, "Uff da," I sighed.
"Uff da, indeed," my stomach replied.
Then I summoned that resolve for which every breed is known.
My hand took the fork as with a mind of its own.
And with reckless abandon that lutefisk I ate,
within twenty seconds I'd cleaned my plate.
Uncle Kermit flashed me an ear-to-ear grin,
as butter and cream sauce dripped from his chin.
Then to my great shock, he whispered in my ear:
"I'm sure glad this is over for another year!"

It was then I learned a great and wonderful truth,
that Swedes and Norwegians, from old men to youth,
must each pay their dues to have the great joy
of being known as a good Scandahoovian boy.

And so to you all, as you face the great test:
Happy Christmas to you, and to you all the best.



Here's another page of Lutefisk Celebration from,

Prophecy Fellowship who've also graciously archived the following story for you.


Newsweek Lutefisk Story Sparks Fury
May 19, 2005 23:14 PDT

Decorah, IA - The debris-strewn streets of this remote Midwestern
hamlet remain under a tense 24-hour curfew tonight, following weekend demonstrations by rock- and figurine-throwing Lutheran farm wives that left over 200 people injured and leveled the Whippy Dip dairy freeze. The rioting appeared to be prompted, in part, by a report in Newsweek magazine claiming military guards at Spirit Lake's notorious Okoboji internment center had flushed lutefisk down prison toilets.


Newsweek's late announcement of a retraction seems to have done
little to quell the inflamed passions of Lutheran insurgents in the
region, as outbreaks of violent mailbox bashings and cow tippings
have been reported from Bowbells, North Dakota to Pekin, Illinois.

Whether the violence was triggered by Newsweek's report of lutefisk desecration or frustration over chronic shortages of Beanie Babies and Old Style, one thing seems certain – occupying U.S. troops face a steep road to reestablish trust in this tinderbox of ancient hatreds and delicious dairy products. Some analysts say the latest outbreak represents the most vexing challenge to US strategy since its invasion the region three years ago.

"It could be months before we get the area back under control," said Brigadier Gen. Glen Hastings of the US Army's Southern Minnesota Command. "We're hoping the tractor pull and swap meet seasons will help calm down some of the violent elements."

`Campground of Evil'

Military efforts to stabilize the violent ethnic Protestantism of the
region have had a mixed record of success. U.S. paratroopers first
landed along the Iowa/Minnesota border in early 2002 to root out
extremist Uff Da militants, followers of the charismatic Lutheran
cleric Pastor Duane Gunderson. Despite fears of being bogged down in the harsh Mankato winter, troops encountered little resistance, save sporadic eggings from ill-equipped insurgents atop the grain elevators of local cornlords. U.S. forces achieved swift success, taking as many as 1,500 Lutheran rebels into custody and bringing a momentary measure of stability to what has long been considered a dangerous Scandinavian backwater.

The initial battlefield victories, however, have since proven to be
only the beginning of the American struggle here. The subsequent
occupation created a number of difficult challenges critics claim
were overlooked by the White House's top Midwest war planners. The tipping point seems to have been a 2004 incident at the now notorious Okoboji.

First constructed as a boredom punishment camp for Midwest dissident youth, the US Military Command converted the sprawling Arnold's Park / Lake Okoboji area into an internment facility to house insurgent detainees. Almost immediately stories began to surface of prisoner mistreatment, including vivisections, anal probes by extraterrestrial strippers, and blackouts of Viking games.

American military spokesmen initially dismissed the stories, but
several news organizations – led by Newsweek – obtained a series of shocking photos of a Texas Army Reservist, Tyffanie Cruddup, laughing as she humiliates a naked inmate by putting a Dallas Cowboys stocking hat on his head.

The photos sent the Lutheran street into riots as far as Rheinlander,
Wisconsin, and sent shockwaves throughout the media world. The
incident received heavy play on network and cable news, the New York Times, Washington Post, Le Monde, the Guardian, Packers Illustrated, and was the subject of over a dozen off-Broadway dramas during the 2004 season. For its part, Newsweek ran a record eight consecutive covers on Okoboji, along with a special commemorative November 3 collector's issue with pull-out humiliation poster.

Luting and Looting

In the wake of the incident, American military spokespeople have
taken pains to defend handling of prisoners at Okoboji. A series of
new guidelines instruct guards to "respect the rituals and traditions
of our valued Lutheran prison guests," including "dietary needs,
Wednesday Nite Bingo, and twice daily viewing of Wheel of Fortune."

"It is important that we remember that Lutheranism is a religion of
peace," said Army spokesman Maj. Richard Lehrman. "And we need to remember to avoid insensitive behavior and remarks that will cause these peaceful Lutherans to go on another bloody killing rampage."

Despite officials' claims of intensified sensitivity, rumors have
persisted of continued prisoner abuse at Okoboji, including lutefisk
desecration – an especially heinous crime under Lutheran doctrine.
Some analysts have viewed the rumors skeptically, pointing to the Uff Da insurgent training manual "How To Lie About Lutefisk Desecration By Infidels." Still, dozens of news organizations continue to investigate the charges.

In its May 6 "Midwest Quagmire Wire" section, Newsweek appeared to have confirmed the lutefisk rumors. Bylined by Senior Correspondent Michael Isikoff, the magazine cited an unidentified source claiming that Okoboji guards had deliberately flushed an entire batch of the pungent cod-and-lye concoction that prisoners had been aging in a specially prepared commode. "The guard smelled it and thought it was prison burrito night," the source was quoted as saying.

News of the desecration spread quickly from Iowa to the Dakotas to Minnesota and Wisconsin, fanned by radio soybean reports and Lutheran clerics in fiery pancake breakfast sermons. Soon, enraged farm wives, clad in their traditional sweater vests and Disney jackets, had taken to the streets and begun a wild spree of destruction, overturning hundreds of rusty Blazers and Pontiac Grand Ams and hurling flaming Lladro porcelain figurines. Decorah was particularly hard-hit, as a frenzied throng of ululating Iowa women were seen looting needlepoint geese and rabbit tchotchkes from a Victorian craft shop. In a chilling moment caught on Army night vision cameras, their plus-size leader urges the mob to attack the near-by Pamida.

"Ya, you betcha!" came the chant of her enraged coreligionist.

After battling back the women with volleys of teargas and Land's End catalogs, a detachment of California reservists finally quelled the riot early Sunday morning, and attended to the injured.

Fake But Not Completely Implausible

As soldiers patrolled the streets of Decorah, Faribault and La Crosse Sunday, Newsweek Editor Mark Whitaker issued a surprising, terse clarification of the original story, saying that the magazine could "no longer vouch for every detail of the story, including the brand of lye used, the number of soldiers and prisoners present, or possibly whether any of it actually happened."

Whitaker, however, declined to retract the story, saying that the
magazine was "standing behind its essential plausibility."

"Obviously, if it causes thousands of native gals go on a berserk
looting rampage, there's got to be something believable in there
somewhere," said Whitaker. "Obviously, it's now up to the
Administration and the DoD to disprove these charges, once they
finish cleaning up the carnage."

In a later and terser clarification, Whitaker said that the
magazine's anonymous source could no longer remember whether he had ever been to Iowa, was in the military, or knew how to
pronounce `lutefisk.' In a still-later, and yet-terser clarification,
Whitaker finally retracted the story after revealing that its
anonymous source was Kippy, Michael Isikoff's imaginary childhood friend.

"This is a really unfortunate accident for everybody," said
Whitaker. "But let's not forget the real victims here – Newsweek,
Mike Isikoff, and especially Kippy."

While retracting the Okoboji accusations, Whitaker said Newsweek
stood by the original article's final two sentences, "Boo-yah! In
your FACE, Chimpy!"

Despite the Newsweek's humiliating public retraction of the
controversial lutefisk abuse charges, tensions remain high across the upper Midwest. Many here discount the retraction as being coerced by White House "crusaders," and believe that other abuses are being covered up at Okoboji.

"Oh yahh, I tell ya what, dere's a lotta bad stuff goin' on in dat
outfit over dere," said a young Decorah cleric who identified himself only as `Pastor Doug.' "I heard dem infidels are switchin' da prisoner's Leinies with Schlitz."


While Running the Lutefisk won’t externally scar you like retrieving coins or statuettes from a kettle of boiling water or carrying the red hot irons across a room will, the dread and foreboding it will presage the remainder of your Christmases with remains a not inconsiderable element in the crafting of a truly authentic Viking Stoicism.

How do you think they got so nonchalant about having it out with three foot long double edged knives, axes and spears? Losing a duel with axes is nothing to just ice down and laugh off over beers. Lutefisk may have been an actual Viking combat training agent; if you can learn to live on Lutefisk there’s probably nothing capable of truly scaring you ever again.

Friday, November 25, 2016

Envisioning a Different Kind of Government: The Icelandic Free State 930-1264AD

We've written a Viking Trilogy. It's top right under Support This Site.

What's the deal?

The Govt of The Viking Age Free State Icelandic Commonwealth, or to be precise, it's near Total Lack of Govt.

This is reposted from our author blog. 


After you've chewed it over, ask yourself What in the world we need with all the Government we have today? It's kinder and gentler? It's more 'Fair'? It makes people free by taking half or more of what they earn to redistribute it?


If there was ever the antithesis of Big Government personified, this was it. 

And if it was such a great idea, what killed it?

3, . . 2, . . 1, . . . Central Control. Anti Competitive Taxing Policies.

Collectivism. 


If you didn't like the services your Chieftain charged you a nominal fee to provide, you could contract with another Chieftain on the other side of the island to do a better job for you, without having to move there.

Imagine how much better service we'd get today from government if we could simply tell government at every level, each and everyone of us on an individual basis, we can and will do something about you.

You're Fired.

via lewrockwell.com

Privatization, Viking Style: Model or Misfortune?


By Roderick T. Long


June 6, 2002

Can the experience of Icelandic Vikings eight centuries ago teach us a lesson about the dangers of privatization? Jared Diamond thinks so. In his article "Living on the Moon," published in the May 23, 2002, issue of the New York Review of Books, Diamond portrays the history of Iceland in the Viking period as a nightmarish vision of privatization run amuck.


Libertarian scholars and free-market enthusiasts have often pointed to the Icelandic Free State (930-1262) as a positive example of a society that functioned successfully with little orno government control. Writing in the Journal of Legal Studies, economist David Friedman observes that the Free State "might almost have been invented by a mad economist to test the lengths to which market systems could supplant government in its most fundamental functions." As Diamond himself notes:


"Medieval Iceland had no bureaucrats, no taxes, no police, and no army. … Of the normal functions of governments elsewhere, some did not exist in Iceland, and others were privatized, including fire-fighting, criminal prosecutions and executions, and care of the poor."


But unlike those who see who see the Icelandic system as a model to emulate, Diamond charges that the Free State's excessively privatized character made it radically unstable, ultimately leading to the system's violent collapse in 1262; his essay has already been cited byThe American Prospect as a crucial resource for those "making the case against privatization and shrinking government." So who's right? Does medieval Iceland illustrate privatization'sbenefits, or its hazards?


Lying in the North Atlantic between Norway and Greenland, its northern shores brushing the Arctic Circle, Iceland is a stark and desolate landscape of basalt and frozen lava, punctuatedby volcanoes, geysers, and glaciers — eerily beautiful for tourists, though a wearying challenge for farmers. Such a harsh natural environment might have attracted few immigrants, were it not for a still harsher political climate back on the mainland. Iceland's first settlers — Norse and Celto-Norse refugees from King Harald Fairhair's attempt in the late ninth century to impose centralized control and property taxes on all of Norway — established what historians call the Icelandic Free State, or Icelandic Commonwealth, around the year 930. In Diamond'swords, "they privatized government beyond Ronald Reagan’s wildest dreams" (since Reagan dramatically increased the size and expense of government over the course of his administration, this is quite an understatement), "and thereby collapsed in a civil war thatcost them their independence."


This "thereby" is somewhat misleading, however, since civil strife did not become a serious problem in Iceland until around 1220, nearly three centuries after the system was established — and the system's final collapse did not come until 42 years after that. As I have writtenelsewhere: "We should be cautious in labeling as a failure a political experiment that flourished longer than the United States has even existed." Indeed, given Diamond's criterion of instability, the United States cannot be called stable until it survives the year 2108. (Though one could argue that it has already failed the test: the United States had to wait only 85 years from its founding before plunging into a catastrophic civil war, by contrast with Iceland's 290 years.)


How did the Icelandic Free State work? The 11th-century historian Adam von Bremen described Iceland as having "no king but the law." The legal system's administration, insofar as it had one, lay in the hands of a parliament of about 40 officers whom historians call, however inadequately, "chieftains." This parliament had no budget and no employees; it met only two weeks per year. In addition to their parliamentary role, chieftains were empowered in their own local districts to appoint judges and to keep the peace; this latter job was handled on an essentially fee-for-service basis. The enforcement of judicial decisions waslargely a matter of self-help (hence Iceland's reputation as a land of constant private feuding), but those who lacked the might to enforce their rights could sell their court-decreed claims for compensation to someone more powerful, usually a chieftain; hence even the poorand friendless could not be victimized with impunity.


The basis of a chieftain's power within the political order was the power he already possessed outside it, in civil society. The office of chieftaincy was private property, and could be bought or sold; hence chieftaincies tended to track private wealth. But wealth alone was not enough. As economic historian Birgir Solvason notes in his masterful study of the period, "just buying the chieftainship was no guarantee of power"; the mere office by itself was "almost worthless" unless the chieftain could "convince some free-farmers to follow him." Chieftains did not hold authority over territorially-defined districts, but competed for clients with other chieftains from the same geographical area.


A chieftain was politician, lawyer, and policeman rolled into one: he represented his clients in parliament, served as their advocate in arbitration, and offered them armed assistance in dispute resolution. If his customers were dissatisfied with the quality or price of these services, they could switch to a different chieftain without having to change their physical location; therelation between chieftain and client could be freely terminated by either party, so that signing up with a chieftain was rather like signing up for insurance or long-distance phone service today; legal jurisdictions were, in effect, "virtual" rather than physical.


The fact that the provision of "governmental" services was a competitive rather than a monopolistic enterprise was arguably one of the Free State's greatest strengths; just as in any other market, the competitive discipline imposed by the fear of losing clients to rival service providers served as a check on inefficiency and abuse of power. Icelandic law owed its resilience and flexibility to this decoupling of authority from geography.


Diamond finds this competitive legal system unprecedented and bizarre: "Everywhere else in the world that I know of, competing chiefs ruled over mutually exclusive territories, within which everyone else had to be that chief’s follower." He seems unaware that non-territorial jurisdiction has been a fairly common phenomenon throughout history; indeed, the prevalence of non-territorial jurisdiction in medieval Europe is often credited with explaining the "rise of the West." It is certainly true, however, that the Free State pressed the principle of non-territorial jurisdiction farther than most.


While non-territorial jurisdiction has its admirers, Diamond is certainly not one of them. On the contrary, he condemns this "weird territorial system" as a "recipe for chaos":


"Freedmen other than chiefs could choose their chief and switch alliances, regardless of which chief happened to reside nearby. A chief's farm became surrounded by a mosaic of smaller farms, some of them occupied by his own followers, others by other chiefs' followers. The resulting feuds fill The Sagas of Icelanders."


Yet in Jesse Byock's Viking Age Iceland, one of the books on which Diamond claims to be basing his analysis, we find precisely the opposite information: the "lack of geographically defined chieftaincies" meant that no group could claim "exclusive or long-time control overany one area"; as a result, there were "few territorial u2018refuge areas'" where "feuding parties lived protected … by a cluster of kin and friends." This "made sustained feuding difficult," creating increased incentives for compromise. In other words, the non-territorial nature of Iceland's legal order served to decrease, not to increase, the violence of feud. (Diamond also asserts that Iceland's lack of a strong central government left it "defenseless against attacks," a charge he substantiates by recounting an incident from 1627 — at which time Iceland was under the "protection" of the Danish crown, and the Free State system Diamond is criticizing had been defunct for nearly four centuries!)


Reading the Icelandic Sagas initially gives the impression of unremitting violence — until one notices that most of the feuds they describe consist of low-casualty skirmishes at long intervals. Though often referred to as "Vikings," Icelanders made their living for the most part through farming and trade, and violence was sporadic; thanks to the economic incentivesprovided by Iceland's legal system, conflicts were settled in court more often than in combat. Like any good storyteller, the authors of the Sagas simply skipped over the long boring periods when nobody was killing anybody.


To keep Icelandic feud in perspective, one may contrast it with continental Europe, whose princes, blessed with "mutually exclusive territories," launched massive wars. As Solvason points out, Icelandic society was "more peaceful and cooperative than its contemporaries"; in England and Norway, by contrast, "the period from about 800 to 1200 is a period of continuous struggle; high in both violence and killings." Byock contrasts the prolonged and violent civil strife which attended Christianization in Norway with its relatively swift and peaceful Icelandic analogue. Icelanders treated the conflict between pagans and Christians as a feud, to be resolved like any other feud — by arbitration. The arbitrator decided in favor of Christianity, and that was that. (So imbued were the Icelanders with the norms of conflict resolution through arbitration that they dealt with haunted houses in the same way — trying the ghosts for trespassing, in the confident expectation that, if found guilty, a good Icelandic ghost would respect the verdict of the court and peacefully depart!) Even at the Free State's worst, during the system's catastrophic breakdown into intestine warfare in the 1200s, the body count was fairly low; as Friedman writes:


"During more than fifty years of what the Icelanders themselves perceived as intolerably violent civil war, leading to the collapse of the traditional system, the average number of people killed or executed each year appears, on a per capita basis, to be roughly equal to the current rate of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter in the United States."


Obviously the level of violence during the three centuries before the civil war must have been even lower.


Diamond is best known for his 1997 book Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, which argues that history is determined primarily by geographical rather thancultural factors; he applies a similar analysis here, maintaining that the Icelanders' radically decentralized political system was forced on them by Iceland's scanty supply of natural resources, leaving them "too poor even to afford a government." (Oh, for such poverty!) In short, the law of Iceland was not the product of its inhabitants' own ideas and values, but was in effect selected for them by the nature of their physical environment.


But didn't the Icelanders choose that environment because they were hostile to centralized power back home? And doesn't the structure of their legal system reflect that very hostility?Diamond can hardly ignore these facts, but he minimizes their importance:


"Having emigrated to Iceland in order to be independent of the growing power of the Norwegian king, Icelanders wanted minimal government anyway, and that attitude let them make a virtue of the necessity imposed by their poverty."


In other words, Icelandic cultural attitudes were causally irrelevant to the outcome; although the system the Icelanders ended up with was to their liking, they would have ended up withmuch the same system whether they liked it or not.


Diamond's portrait of medieval Icelandic society as crippled by extreme poverty is not borne out by the evidence. In their supposedly hapless and half-starved condition, Icelanderscreated a rich literary tradition of Eddas and Sagas, developed a sophisticated legal code, and mounted voyages of exploration to North America — activities that would seem to indicate a higher degree of prosperity and leisure than Diamond suggests. Arguing that Icelanders were in fact relatively affluent, Solvason points to the steady improvement of economic conditions and increased production of export goods over the course of the Free State period.


Ship ownership was far rarer in Iceland than one might expect in an island community, particularly a "Viking" one; Diamond surmises that this is because Iceland was poor in timber(or quickly became so as settlers unsustainably exploited Iceland's natural resources), so that "the original ships of the settlers could not be replaced by new ships." He infers that Iceland,being "almost entirely without ocean-going ships of its own," was left at the mercy of foreign navigators who "controlled and exploited Iceland's trade." But as Solvason points out, timber was regularly imported to Iceland for a variety of purposes, and could have been used for shipbuilding if ships had been wanted; Solvason concludes that Icelanders voluntarily chose to exploit their comparative advantage in ranching (among Iceland's chief exports were meat and wool) and leave shipbuilding to others, presumably because they found this decision more profitable.


Diamond's geography-is-destiny approach to history deserves our skepticism in any case. The world is full of bleak, inhospitable, resource-poor regions whose inhabitants scratch out a meager living; but how many such regions have left us a cultural legacy comparable to medieval Iceland's? Diamond would do well to heed philosopher R. G. Collingwood's dictum that history is ultimately determined not by nature, but by what human beings make of nature. By all evidence, Icelanders maintained their privatized political system, not because they were driven by poverty and necessity to do so (though Diamond apparently finds their system so uncongenial that he can conceive no other reason), but quite simply because it worked.


But if the Icelandic Free State was so successful, why did it eventually collapse? Clearly, the explanation lies in the growing centralization of wealth and power. As Diamond writes:


"Originally, soon after settlement, Iceland had about 4,500 independent farms, but by the thirteenth century 80 percent of Iceland's farmland was owned by five families, and all the other formerly independent farmers had become tenants."


These five families also managed to buy up most of the chieftaincies, enabling them to dominate the courts and parliament. The concentration of chieftaincies in fewer hands also meant an end to the existence of competing chieftains within the same territory; Iceland began to be fractured into regions, each operating as a local monopoly or mini-state. During the years 1220-1262, the resulting struggle for hegemony among these mini-states broke out into open conflict, a crisis that was finally resolved only when the Icelanders, exhausted by civil war, invited King Haakon of Norway to govern them, thus bringing the Free State period to a close.


To Diamond, this final decision illustrates the utter bankruptcy of the Icelandic system: "I cannot think of another historical case of an independent country that became so desperate that it turned itself over to another country." Perhaps he should have tried harder; he might have remembered England in 1688, offering the crown to William of Orange after deposing the Stuarts — or, harking farther back, the many small states who responded to civil strife by calling in a Roman garrison, thus submitting de facto to Roman authority. Moreover, the very desperation of the move indicates how unaccustomed the Icelanders were to levels of violence that had long been commonplace on the mainland. In any case, the Icelanders presumably saw the Covenant of 1262-64, not as a surrender of national independence, but simply as yet another case of signing up with a new chieftain because their previous chieftains had proven unsatisfactory. This new chieftain, the Norwegian king, was farther away, and so perhaps less dangerous; certainly he was wealthier than any Icelandic chieftain, and so (they imagined) less tax-hungry. What they failed to recognize was the incentive implications of switching from a competitive system to a monopolistic one — though admittedly, their own system had lost much of its competitive character already. (War is not a form of competition; it is what arises when competition breaks down.)


The process of competitive chieftaincies turning into monopolistic mini-states is obviously a move toward less privatization, not more; and it was precisely when Iceland had become less privatized and more like mainland Europe — a collection of principalities vying for supremacy — that it collapsed into the kind of large-scale warfare that had raged across the rest of Europe for centuries. It seems rather unfair, then, to blame this catastrophe on privatization. Still, why didn't Iceland's privatized system of law prevent the increasing concentration of wealth and power in the first place? Was this failure symptomatic of an inherent flaw in the Icelandic system?


Typically, Diamond offers an environmental explanation for the increasing concentration of wealth: Iceland's harsh climate. "In cold years the poorer farms culled or lost their livestock in the winter because of insufficient hay," and so were "forced to become debtors who were dependent on others for survival." The cogency of this explanation is doubtful. Wealthier farmers had more hay, but they presumably also had more livestock; hence they most likely did not have more hay per head of livestock. Since wealth was held predominantly in land and livestock, not in currency, it's unclear why hard winters should be expected to have a less severe impact on wealthy farmers than on poor ones.


A more plausible explanation for the Free State's decline points to the introduction of the tithe in 1096. Made possible by Iceland's conversion to Christianity a century earlier, the tithe— to pay church officials and maintain church buildings — was Iceland's first real tax. (Previous "taxes" generally turn out on closer inspection to be voluntary exchanges of fees for services.) Assessed at 1% of the payer's property, it was also Iceland's first graduated tax (earlier fees were one-size-fits-all), and so took in much more revenue. Most importantly, the tithe lacked a competitive element. Recall the non-territorial character of a chieftain's jurisdiction: a chieftain's temptations to self-aggrandizement were kept in check by the knowledge that if he acquired delusions of grandeur or charged too high a price for his services, his clients could abandon him for a rival. But the tithe was territorial; all those who lived in the vicinity of a particular church building had to pay for its upkeep, and were not at liberty to transfer their support elsewhere. The catch is that the portion of tithe revenue allocated to maintaining church buildings went not to the official church hierarchy but to the wealthy private owners (usually chieftains) of stadhir, "churchsteads," i.e., plots of land on which churches had been built. The tithe was a property tax; but chieftaincies, though marketable commodities, were exempt — as were the churchsteads themselves, predominantly owned by chieftains. (The parliament that enacted the tithe law was of course composed entirely of chieftains.)


The tithe thus did more than just increase the income of the chieftains; it decoupled that income from accountability. Economic inequalities per se are not a serious threat to liberty so long as they operate in a genuine market context, where the way to gain and maintain wealth is to please one's customers; before the introduction of the tithe, a chieftain who proved toopower-hungry would alienate his customers and so suffer financial discipline. But chieftains who owned churchsteads now had a captive market, and so were freed from all competitive restraints on their accumulation of wealth and power. Through buying off or intimidatingless wealthy chieftains, the top families were able to gain control of multiple chieftaincies. This gave them a lock on the parliament, enabling them to pass still further taxes; it also decreased competition among chieftains, allowing them to charge monopoly prices and drivetheir clients into a serf-like state of debt and dependence.


The Icelandic system did fall through an inherent flaw, then, but not the one Diamond imagines; the Free State failed, not through having too much privatization, but through having too little. The tithe, and particularly the portion allotted to churchstead maintenance, represented a monopolistic, non-competitive element in the system. The introduction of the tithe was in turn made possible by yet another non-competitive element: the establishment of an official state church which everyone was legally bound to support. Finally, buying up chieftaincies would have availed little if there had been free entry into the chieftaincy profession; instead, the number of chieftains was set by law, and the creation of new chieftaincies could be approved only by parliament — i.e., by the existing chieftains, who were naturally less than eager to encourage competitors. It is precisely those respects in which the Free State was least privatized and decentralized that led to its downfall — while its more privatized aspects delayed that downfall for three centuries.


Diamond pities the medieval Icelanders. We might do better to emulate them.


Further Reading


Bruce Benson. The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State. Pacific Research Institute, San Francisco, 1990.


Tom W. Bell. "Polycentric Law." Humane Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1991/92.


Jesse L. Byock. Feud in the Icelandic Saga. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1982.


—–. Medieval Iceland: Society, Sagas, and Power. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988.


—–. Viking Age Iceland. Penguin, London, 2001.


David Friedman. "Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case." Journal of Legal Studies 8, 1979.


—–. The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism. Second Edition. Open Court, La Salle, 1989. Chapter 44.


—–. "Viking Iceland: Anarchy that Worked," Liberty 2, no. 6 (July 1989), pp. 37-40.


Albert Loan. "Institutional Bases of the Spontaneous Order: Surety and Assurance." Humane Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1992.


Roderick T. Long. "The Decline and Fall of Private Law in Iceland." Formulations 1, no. 3 (Spring 1994).


William I. Miller. Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland.University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990.


Birgir T. Runolfsson Solvason. Ordered Anarchy, State, and Rent-Seeking: The Icelandic Commonwealth, 930-1264. Ph.D. Dissertation in Economics, George Mason University, 1991.


—–. "Ordered Anarchy: Evolution of the Decentralized Legal Order in the IcelandicCommonwealth," Icelandic Economic Papers 17 (1992).


—–. 1993. "Institutional Evolution in the Icelandic Commonwealth." Constitutional Political Economy 4, no. 1, pp. 97-125.


June 6, 2002

Roderick T. Long [send him mail] is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Auburn University, President of the Alabama Philosophical Society, Editor of the Libertarian Nation Foundation periodical Formulations, and an Adjunct Scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute.


The Best of Roderick T. Long





Wednesday, November 2, 2016

Shameless Self Promotion: Buy Our Book/s: 3 in 1 for just $4.99

We don't ask for donations here.

Today we're asking for money in trade for something more than our undying gratitude. You send Amazon $4.99 and they send you our 3 full novel length e-books as a single volume of Viking fiction.

Here's our Author Blog, with real Viking Resources and Links.


Always last to leave

What if you killed someone for insulting you, and when their family took you to court the judges punished them instead of you, for insulting the law because the dead person knew what the law was and they must have wanted it because they certainly went begging for it.

One continuous Saga of Love, Murder, and War among people who'll balk at nothing but a saleable excuse for their crooked courts, complete as the Full Saga or available as 3 separate Volumes/Parts.

In Volume/Part I, Grab The Wolf, Chieftains conspire, vengeance for old killings visits, and loves and obsessions turn to murder.

In Volume/Part II, Kill Them Twice, conspiracies bear fruit as battle presages battle, hunters hunt, and war invades the forests.

In Volume/Part III, war trades faces as the law and honor shove the hunter home guard, sailors, and everyone's kin at the other's throats.

In the year 1000 Leif Erikson sailed to the New World and back to Greenland.

This time Viking Outlaws who'd been run out of everywhere sailed back in droves to the island of Hellulandia (Newfoundland). Many of the Irish too sailed to New Tara (Chesapeake Bay) hoping to finally rid themselves of those damn Norwegians and Danes. No such luck.

Eventually, on Hellulandia, law and order broke out again and their own outlaws were tossed off the island west onto Skoggangurstrond (Outlaws Coast/New Brunswick) where their descendants eventually again imposed law and order, sort of, under new Chieftains who also took to outlawing and booting out their own trash.

It's the year 1279 and everyone including the Skraelings who've been there long before the Norse and Irish are plotting to get rid of those double, triple, and quadruple crossing guys who aren't their guys just one last time, all over again.

Dead in the middle of Skoggangurstrond where all crossings converge are Chieftain Tore's Ravens, who know a good deal about what's going to crop up, having planted it, and great deal more about cutting it down.

Tore and his crews are heading off to New Tara, leaving behind them his twelve hunters, their leader his criminally womanizing Marshal, the village priest and a blacksmith who are not supposed to even see the army headed their way. Destroying it has been left in other hands.

But, . . .

In the icy, edge of spring forest night a hundred women and girls who can't stop fighting with each other and have never killed anything worse than crop raiding pests follow the hunters into their black and forbidding realm against an army twice the size those other hands haven't done a thing about.

Foremost among Marshal Jarnulf's fighting women are his current woman, and a most enticing infuriation, his ex, warring with him and each other over who really owns him.

With bows, and steel they barely know how to use, the women can't win a fight and they know it.

But with the skills of their hunters, undreamt even now, they're going to find that in war as in love fair is a fable untold by an idiot, because fair killed him before he could tell it.

Ravens, always last to leave the field of battle.


You can read a third of Book I free at Amazon by clicking on the cover image for a 'Look Inside This Book'.

Look inside the individual Vol. 2 and Vol. 3 to see how the story evolves.

What would a Viking hero do as a part of the Home Guard in a village full of women when their husbands are all off at sea?

Work, feed the fire, drink, board game, and, .. .

In that culture even kissing a girl without getting her menfolk's blessing first (usually including marriage) could get an axe chopped into your head.

High stakes, endless potential.

If you enjoy it and would like to continue financially supporting this site 24/7/365, without spending another cent, please post a positive review at Amazon asking other readers to send us their money too.


Advice for writers,