Gillette: The Worst a Man Can Get

frontpagemag
Mark Tapson, Jan 19, 2019


Has the Marxist assault on masculinity pushed men too far?
So far, 2019 seems to be establishing itself as a year in which the cultural Marxists are intensifying their war on traditional masculinity. But it may turn out to be the year in which the misandrist tide begins to turn.

In just the last week, the American Psychological Association (APA) caused a stir by declaring traditional masculinity – “marked by stoicism, competitiveness, dominance and aggression” – to be a “harmful” mental disorder. Then People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), sharing online a grotesquely suggestive video declaring that “Traditional masculinity is dead,” suggested that we “cure toxic masculinity by going vegan.” In another example, the New York Times posted a piece last Friday praising “The New Angry Young Men: Rockers Who Rail Against ‘Toxic Masculinity’” with songs that “protest old notions of manhood.” The article concludes with one singer declaring, “Toxic masculinity is real.”

It is not real. Toxicity is not an inherent feature of masculinity, just as “stoicism, competitiveness, dominance and aggression” are not inherently bad – far from it, in fact. Without those propulsive masculine qualities, which the APA deems harmful, humankind would never have elevated itself from cave to civilization. Unfortunately, the term “toxic masculinity” has become deeply embedded in our cultural consciousness now and is being conflated intentionally with traditional masculinity. That’s because the endgame of the totalitarians pushing this concept is to emasculate Western civilization in order to erect a collectivist utopia in its stead.

But the most controversial assault on masculinity in the last week was razor company Gillette’s release of a two-minute promotional video called “We Believe: the Best Men Can Be.” It immediately went viral with well over 19 million views (as of this writing) and spurred a massive backlash. Down-votes on YouTube were originally running at a 10-to-1 ratio over up-votes (that gap narrowed quickly and suspiciously to a 2-to-1 ratio). “Bullying… the Me Too movement against sexual harassment… masculinity,” the voiceover begins, clearly linking all three and depicting various examples of ugly behavior on the part of (almost exclusively Caucasian) boys and men. “We believe in the best in men,” the voiceover intones unconvincingly, after shaming men collectively for the worst in men. “To say the right thing, to act the right way. Some already are, in ways big and small. But some is not enough. Because the boys watching today will be the men of tomorrow.”







Encouraging men to aspire to their best character is actually an admirable message. Men should strive to be the best husbands, fathers, sons, the best men they can be. Bullying and sexual harassment (neither of which is exclusive to men, by the way) are unacceptable. But consider the context in which this ad appeared: the aforementioned APA report labeling traditional masculinity harmful; the ongoing demonization of men via the out-of-control #MeToo movement; the relentless messaging that masculinity is an outmoded cliché, something that must be discarded for us to evolve; and behind all this, literally decades of vicious browbeating from feminists whose goal is not equality but the eradication of masculinity. Then along comes this virtue-signaling Gillette ad stating that only “some” men are decent and the rest are pigs.

For many, that may have been the last straw. Social media swarmed with men (and supportive women) swearing off Gillette products. Op-eds defending masculinity, and denouncing the ad as ill-advised at best, abounded.

A PR expert quoted at The Guardian (a publication which devotes a significant amount of space to bashing norms of masculinity) praised the ad and said, “It is no longer enough for brands to simply sell a product. Customers are demanding that they have a purpose – that they stand for something. Masculinity is a huge part of Gillette’s brand, and there is a recognition in this ad that the new generation is reworking that concept of masculinity, and it is no longer the cliché it once was.”

Some have put forth the argument that Gillette, whose tagline used to be “The Best a Man Can Get,” was making not a political statement but simply a calculated marketing move for publicity, much like Nike did last year by making the cop-hating Communist Colin Kaepernick the face of a highly controversial “Just Do It” campaign. That argument falls apart in light of the fact that the creator of the Gillette video is “philosophically unpleasant” feminist Kim Gehrig, of the UK-based production agency Somesuch. Gehrig was behind an ad campaign for Sport England called “This Girl Can” and “Viva La Vulva,” an ad for a Swedish feminine hygiene brand “which boldly challenged the stigmas around women’s periods,” according to AdWeek. The ragingly misandrist Jezebel website reported that Gehrig sent an email to CNBC which read, “At the end of the day, sparking conversation is what matters. This gets people to pay attention to the topic and encourages them to consider taking action to make a difference.”

So presumably the motive for the Gillette ad was more activism than profit, although of course the company hoped to score the same net boost in customers that Nike’s Kaepernick ad did. As The Intelligencer points out, however, the difference between that ad and Gillette’s is that the former “is uplifting rather than accusatory.” By contrast, the Gillette ad is a “downer.” (For a more uplifting, sympathetic take on masculinity, check out this video response to the Gillette ad from Egard Watches.)

Of course, the Left embraced the ad (imagine their apoplectic outrage if an ad campaign dared to address “toxic femininity”). One male Twitter user remarked that “if your masculinity is THAT threatened by an ad that says we should be nicer then you're doing masculinity wrong.” This is way off the mark. Men weren’t threatened by the ad; they were insulted by it. It sparked widespread anger because men are fed up with being demonized. They are fed up with having masculinity equated with bullying and sexual harassment. They are fed up with being told that their very nature is poisonous and that redefining masculinity means acting like stereotypical women. Countless good men who are quietly leading lives as protectors and providers and role models and unacknowledged heroes are fed up with the cultural insistence that masculinity is a dire problem instead of a dynamic life force.

The pushback against the Gillette ad and the APA report are evidence that the Marxist assault on Western masculinity is finally beginning to be met with resistance. Men and the women who love traditional masculinity (i.e., the majority of them) are getting mad as hell and they’re not going to take it anymore.



Thank You FPM and Mr Tapson.

The APA has Come Up with a New Definition of “Masculinity”

Democrats are having a $5Billion Govt Shutdown Tantrum to Stop a Border Wall to Keep Out Gang Members, Murderers, Drug Dealers, etc. 

But we Still have money to fund this Destructive Crap.

Hot Air
Jazz Shaw Posted at 2:41 pm on January 9, 2019

What does the word “masculinity” mean to you? If you’re a liberal you’ve probably already mentally inserted the word “toxic” in front of it because, well… it’s 2019. If not, then you’re likely picturing the virtues and work ethic many fathers attempt to pass on to their sons. But now, at least according to the increasingly SJW obsessed American Psychological Association, there’s another answer to that question. Masculinity is a harmful psychological condition which males in a civilized society need to be weaned off of. 

 

See Also: Vox asks: Why doesn’t anyone want to host the Oscars?

I first caught wind of this from a great Twitter thread by John P Wright. If you haven’t seen it yet it’s worth the click.

TRENDING:

AOC: When does nonstop criticism of me by the Daily Caller rise to the level of "harassment"?

The link below will take you to the new APA guidance document that defines "traditional masculinity" as unhealthy for men. I encourage you to read it and to evaluate its arguments & suggestions. This matters and I will explain why. https://t.co/1KAwizWfQy

— John P Wright (@cjprofman) January 7, 2019

NBC News picked up the story this week and, to nobody’s surprise, seemed to give it a glowing review. Their summary here does a good job of encapsulating the insanity which now passes for “science” in the APA. (Emphasis added)

For the first time in its 127-year history, the American Psychological Association has issued guidelines to help psychologists specifically address the issues of men and boys — and the 36-page document features a warning.
“Traditional masculinity ideology has been shown to limit males’ psychological development, constrain their behavior, result in gender role strain and gender role conflict and negatively influence mental health and physical health,” the report warns.

The new “Guidelines for the Psychological Practice with Boys and Men” defines “masculinity ideology” as “a particular constellation of standards that have held sway over large segments of the population, including: anti-femininity, achievement, eschewal of the appearance of weakness, and adventure, risk, and violence.” The report also links this ideology to homophobia, bullying and sexual harassment.

Simply incredible. You can read the full report here if you wish, but here’s a short summary which demonstrates this newly adopted standard of describing masculinity (with a thinly veiled conflation with conservative values) as something dangerous and destructive.

The main thrust of the subsequent research is that traditional masculinity—marked by stoicism, competitiveness, dominance and aggression—is, on the whole, harmful. Men socialized in this way are less likely to engage in healthy behaviors. For example, a 2011 study led by Kristen Springer, PhD, of Rutgers University, found that men with the strongest beliefs about masculinity were only half as likely as men with more moderate masculine beliefs to get preventive health care. And in 2007, researchers led by James Mahalik, PhD, of Boston College, found that the more men conformed to masculine norms, the more likely they were to consider as normal risky health behaviors such as heavy drinking, using tobacco and avoiding vegetables, and to engage in these risky behaviors themselves.

Holy smokes. Apparently attributes such as “stoicism, competitiveness, dominance, and aggression” should now be bred out of society. I suppose competitiveness is a negative attribute if you’re trying to remake society into a socialist model. I’m also sitting here trying to picture what sort of military you could lead into the field without dominance and aggression.
 
We’re apparently supposed to believe that the male ideal in the 21st century is essentially a nation full of pajama boys. Let’s all pour a cup of hot chocolate and talk about our feelings. And in the process, attempt to tamp down and drown out millions of years worth of evolution and instincts. No thanks, folks. If this is the brave new world we’re leaving for the next generation, I’m grateful that I won’t live to see too many decades of it. Best of luck to the rest of you.

Tags: american psychiatric association gender masculinity toxic masculinity

 

 

Thank You Mr Shaw and Hot Air. 

Shall We Add A Little Lithium To The Water Supply?

Mind Control Tops U.S. Healthcare Spending

zerohedge
Tyler Durden Fri, 10/26/2018 - 20:45

A Tufts psychology professor and Harvard Medical School lecturer has recommended dosing US water supplies with the lithium in order to reduce suicide rates, saving an estimated 15,000 - 25,000 lives per year.

Appearing on the Vox podcast "Future Perfect," psychiatrist and researcher Dr. Nassir Ghaemi, MD explains that a 2014 review he co-authored analyzing five studies concluded that areas of the country with higher levels of naturally occurring lithium in the water supply had lower suicide rates. Areas with particularly high concentrations have as much as a 50 to 60 percent reduction.
"In general, in the United States, lithium levels are much higher in the Northeast and East Coast and very low in the Mountain West," Ghaemi told Vox, adding "And suicide rates track that exactly — much lower suicide rates in the Northeast, and the highest rates of suicide are in the Mountain West."

If you apply that 50 to 60 percent reduction to the US, where about 45,000 people total died by suicide in 2016, you get a total number of lives saved at around 22,500 to 27,000 a year. That’s likely too high, since you can’t reduce suicide rates in places that are already high-lithium. Ghaemi’s own back-of-the-envelope calculation is that we’d save 15,000 to 25,000.

Ghaemi and a number of other eminent psychiatrists are making a pretty remarkable claim. They think we could save tens of thousands of lives a year with a very simple, low-cost intervention: putting small amounts of lithium, amounts likely too small to have significant side effects, into our drinking water, the way we put fluoride in to protect our teeth. -Vox

Experts don't agree
While Ghaemi is confident in the life-saving effects of making everybody comfortably numb, several other studies have placed the possible positive effects at minimal to nil. 

In 2015, the Open Philanthropy Project, a large-scale grantmaking group in San Francisco, shared an analysis with me implying that if two specific studies were right, a “small increase in the amount of trace lithium in drinking water in the U.S. could prevent > 4,000 suicides per year.” That’s significant, but far short of 15,000 to 25,000.

And while Ghaemi is very enthusiastic about the potential of groundwater lithium, other researchers are more wary. A comprehensive list of lithium studies, updated just last month, shows that while many studies find positive effects, plenty more found no impact on suicide or other important outcomes. In particular, a large-scale Danish study released in 2017 found “no significant indication of an association between increasing … lithium exposure level and decreasing suicide rate.” -Vox

In response to the new studies, the Open Philanthropy Project has said that the Danish study "makes us substantially less optimistic" that trace amounts of lithium actually reduce suicides. Meanwhile, another study using health care claims in teh US found that more lithium in the water doesn't translate to lower diagnoses of dimentia or bipolar disorder.  

That said, Vox's Dylan Matthews writes: "At the very least, I’d love for some governments to conduct real, bona fide experiments on lithium. Maybe a state could randomly add lithium to some of its reservoirs but not others, or, conversely, a high-lithium state could try removing it from the water. There are serious ethical questions about doing experiments like this that affect whole populations, but if lithium’s effect is real and we don’t pursue it because we lack compelling enough evidence, thereby endangering thousands of people — that’s an ethical problem too." 

In other words, we should go ahead and just try dosing a few populations to see what happens! 


Thank You Mr Durden and Zerohedge.


Burt Gummer said it best to 2 Govt spooks who wanted to save the monster and "Research" it into a bio weapon in Tremors 6, Cold Day In Hell. 

"Malevolent Ineptoids."

The Global ‘Mental Health’ Movement – Cause For Concern

madinamerica
Justin Karter 10/10/2018

This week, we present the first in a series of interviews on the topic of the global ‘mental health’ movement. These interviews will be led by our Mad in America research news team.

[Ed; at the link. Listen to interview]

In this episode, we interview Dr. Melissa Raven, who is a psychiatric epidemiologist, policy analyst and postdoctoral research fellow in the Critical and Ethical Mental Health research group at the University of Adelaide, South Australia. Originally qualified as a clinical psychologist, she then worked as a lecturer and researcher in public health and primary health care. Her current mental health research and advocacy is informed by a strong social determinants perspective and a strong critical orientation, which she applies to a range of topics, including suicide prevention, workplace mental health, (over)diagnosis, (inappropriate) prescribing, and conflicts of interest in mental health and the broader health/welfare arena.

On October 10th, 2018, World Mental Health Day, The Lancet Commission on Global Mental Health and Sustainable Development published a report outlining a proposal to “scale up” mental health care globally. At the same time, the UK government is hosting a Global Mental Health Ministerial Summit with the intention of laying out a course of action to implement these mental health policies globally.

In response, a coalition of mental health activists and service-users have organized an open letter detailing their concerns with the summit and report. The response has attracted the support of critical professionals, psychologists, psychiatrists, and researchers. 


Thank You Mr Karter and MIA.

To Understand Christine Blasey Ford, Take a look at Palo Alto University

Psychiatrists And Psychologists Are Not Reliable Witnesses

The Most Dangerous Idea in Mental Health

• Social Justice (17)

Cracks Appearing in the Psychological Trojan Horse of 'Social Justice'. . . . FINALLY!

Social Justice in plain and simple English means Collectivism.

For Collectivism to work society must have Governments multiple times the size and number of the governed. That equation never breeds anything but corruption and repression. 

If history teaches us anything about Collectivism, it is the unrelenting truth that special rights for anyone come at the cost of the deprivation of everyone else's Rights, which becomes the round robin of ever increasing calls for More of the Social Justice Rot which caused it in the 1st place.



"Governments are instinctively, automatically, and inevitably, Tyrannies. There's no question about it."

Social Justice requires more, and ever more, Government to rip more Special Rights out of their Vote Whoring butts to snooker the electorate into 'Feeling Better', about what they've been Promised.

madinamerica

Zenobia Morrill

September 24, 2018

In a new article, published in the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, scholars Erin Thrift and Jeff Sugarman present a thoughtful analysis of the term social justice and its use in the field of psychology. They outline the term’s multifaceted and complex history, illustrating that its usage today by psychologists may be reductive and problematic.

“History should give pause to psychologists who claim social justice as their mission,” Thrift and Sugarman write. “Social justice has become a ‘cultural keyword’ and, consequently, whether psychologists realize it or not, invoking the term thrusts them and the discipline into a broader debate about human freedom, individual and collective responsibility, and the role of the state.”

The meaning of the term “social justice,” in Western, democratic states, has shifted throughout history.  It has transformed alongside cultural developments and milestones and has garnered increased attention in recent years. Thrift and Sugarman point out that the definition of social justice lacks specificity, clarity, and consensus. Nevertheless, the field of psychology has aligned itself with a social justice mission, leaving some to wonder what exactly that mission means and entails.

“Although many psychologists proclaim social justice as central to their disciplinary and professional mission, it is not at all clear what psychologists mean by ‘social justice’ and how they contribute to its aims,” Thrift and Sugarman write. “Without clarity as to the meaning of social justice, we are no further ahead.”

The authors begin by outlining the multifaceted history of the term “social justice” in English speaking Western democratic countries and follow this with an analysis of its meaning within the field of psychology. They trace back the usage of the term to debates concerning the fair economic distribution of material goods and power and the reduction of the risks inherent in the capitalist political system. The term social justice was not originally used in reference to movements for gender or racial equality, as those injustices were said to have “remained invisible” until around the 1970s. The meaning of social justice shifted around this time, and it began to be applied to inequalities in nonmaterial goods, such as the recognition of difference and identity issues.
Thrift and Sugarman argue that the term has been misappropriated with the rise of neoliberal economics in the 70s and 80s. In this context, its meaning has been employed to refer to social justice as an individual virtue rather than a collective endeavor, a usage antithetical to the term’s original purpose. This shift in meaning transforms social injustices into conflicts reconcilable by private charity practices and self-care rather than movements for accountability and the reformation of systems and corporations. Discussing the neoliberal usage of the term social justice, Thrift and Sugarman write:

“Concepts can be reinterpreted over time. However, in this case, such a severe break with historical meaning is more likely opportunistic coopting of the term than a shift legitimately warranted by judicious conceptual analysis.”

Despite its origin, the differing views and conceptualizations of social justice now represent “the nexus of a struggle among different political factions,” they write. Not all views and conceptualizations sufficiently address the term in its complexity, however. Thrift and Sugarman argue that for the term social justice to be consistent with this complex history, its utilization must acknowledge (1) its historical development and meaning, and (2) the contemporary challenges that surround its usage.

“The history of social justice points to the necessity of understanding its complex and multifaceted nature,” they write. “Therefore, any accounts of social justice that are overly narrow (e.g., attending only to the redistribution of material goods or to identity politics) cannot adequately represent the concept.”

According to the authors, psychology, as a field, has aligned itself more closely with some conceptualizations of social justice than others. Psychologists have been criticized for adopting a more “identity politics” approach to social justice in which they reductively attend to issues of identity and recognition while overlooking the intersection of identity with economic inequalities and broader structural concerns. It is not just that the privileging of identity-focused views of social justice obscures economic inequities associated with capitalism, but, as Thrift and Sugarman emphasize, it takes a complicit stance that allows for the perpetuation of these injustices. In this sense, psychologists have predominantly aligned with a reductive approach to social justice and in doing so have undermined their stated mission.
Claiming expertise in defining and treating psychological problems, the field of psychology has considerable influence on the use and understanding of social justice. As a result, “confusion over the meaning of social justice has implications for psychologists interested in pursuing this aim, but also has broader political, social, and economic consequences,” Thrift and Sugarman argue. When psychologists promote the idea that psychological suffering is a state resolvable exclusively through individual interventions, such as psychotherapy, behavior changes, or drug treatments, structural issues can be ignored and perpetuated.

“Psychological explanations often have diverted attention from social, political, and cultural injustices and, in so doing, at least deflected, if not prevented, individuals from political participation, “they write.

The authors go on to outline how specific psychological explanations have deflected individuals from political participation and prevented systemic reforms. For instance, the suffering and subjugation of women was explained by hysteria, racial discrimination was justified by the inferior intelligence of people of color, homosexuality was classified as a mental disorder in the DSM, non-Western families are described as “enmeshed,” and the negative impact of poverty on childhood academic achievement has been recast as a lack of self-discipline or as deficits in other internal characteristics.

Not only are structural problems obscured in these explanations, but they are replaced with interpretations that exclusively place responsibility on individuals or individual characteristics. The authors write:

“A widespread error in psychology is that failing to recognize the constitutive force of our sociopolitical and economic institutions has led to fixing features of persons to human nature rather than to the institutions within which they become persons.”

Further, they illustrate that this approach is antithetical to social justice, as it was initially conceived, and contributes to neoliberal economics and the injustices that arise from current economic and political systems.

“Psychologists’ endorsement of social justice may not only disguise the social and political sources of many mental health problems,” they write, “but also further bolster the neoliberal ideal of individuals as self-responsible, competitive, enterprising, risk-seeking, adaptable individuals, who bear sole responsibility for their circumstances, who do not require or even eschew government support, and whose freedom is manifested by their capacity for choice.”

Thrift and Sugarman point out that psychologists benefit from an individualized promotion of social justice. Psychology as a field is “embedded in the market economy,” they write, so framing problems as arising from the individual may increase demand for psychological services. “Consequently, there may be little professional or economic incentive for psychologists to conceptualize personal difficulties other than in terms of the individual.”

“Thus, psychologists aspiring to work for social justice should be judicious in their use of the term and cognizant of the political consequences they are promoting (even inadvertently).”

The authors observe this pattern in contemporary psychology practice. For example, lowered diagnostic thresholds and loosened criteria support claims that 46.6% of the U.S. population will experience a mental illness in their lifetime.  As demand increases, so does the value of psychological services. Thus, psychology profits from promoting a reductive form of social justice that is contrary to its perceived aims.
One way to address the issue of harmful practices in the name of social justice is to develop greater clarity and consensus around the term. The authors argue that there is currently no coherent framework for evaluating and implementing social justice claims. In response, they propose adopting a structure promoted by Fraser (2009), which addresses three fundamental questions:

1. “What is the good of social justice?” (principle of participational parity)
2. “Who is owed social justice?” (all-affected principle)
3. “How are we to make decisions related to all aspects of social justice?” (all-subjected principle)

Fraser argues for a “principle of participatory parity,” meaning that all injustices should be considered as violations of social justice. Social justice and violations of social justice are evaluated in this framework “in terms of their effect on a person’s ability to participate socially and politically on equal grounds with their peers.” To address contemporary issues that surround social justice claims, the authors argue that globalization of social justice pursuits must be framed beyond the interest of a nation-state and must be able to recognize global injustices committed by transnational corporations.
For the field of psychology to apply social justice in terms of the principle of participational parity, Thrift and Sugarman suggest reflection on the following question:

“How does psychological theorizing, research, or interventions help create social, cultural, political, and economic arrangements that permit individuals to participate on an equal level with their peers?”

They argue that the response from the field must go beyond simply promoting and increasing access to psychological services. Social justice calls for a large-scale reshaping of psychological services to address rather than undermine sociopolitical and economic issues.

“If psychologists are to serve the interests of social justice, they cannot take their responsibility simply as helping individuals manage their anxiety in an unjust economic order,” Thrift and Sugarman write. “Psychological services that merely help individuals adjust to circumstances of poverty and inequality, without doing anything to change these conditions, is a disservice to social justice. It perpetuates the role of psychologists as ‘architects of adjustment’ who preserve and protect the status quo, rather than as advocates for sociopolitical reform.”

****

Thrift, E., & Sugarman, J. (2018, September 13). What Is Social Justice? Implications for Psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. Advance online publication. (Link)


Thank You Zenobia Morrill and MIA.

Online Bettors Can Sniff Out Weak Psychology Studies

Yes, it Is that blatant.

The Atlantic
Ed Yong Aug 27, 2018 

So Why Can't The Journals That Publish Them?

Psychologists are in the midst of an ongoing, difficult reckoning. Many believe that their field is experiencing a “reproducibility crisis,” because they’ve tried and failed to repeat experiments done by their peers. Even classic results—the stuff of textbooks and TED talks—have proven surprisingly hard to replicate, perhaps because they’re the results of poor methods and statistical tomfoolery. These problems have spawned a community of researchers dedicated to improving the practices of their field and forging a more reliable way of doing science.

These attempts at reform have met resistance. Critics have argued that the so-called crisis is nothing of the sort, and that researchers who have failed to repeat past experiments were variously incompetent, prejudiced, or acting in bad faith.

But if those critiques are correct, then why is it that scientists seem to be remarkably good at predicting which studies in psychology and other social sciences will replicate, and which will not? 

Continue Reading

Thank You Mr Yong and the Atlantic. 


What did you expect?

• Alfred Adler: Delusional Marxist Dupe
• Alfred Adler: Marxist Crackpot At A Glance
• BF Skinner: Beyond Freedom & Reason & Dignity
• Bleuler The Schizophrenifier: Séance Scientist
• Carl Jung: Alchemy, Astrology, Flying Saucers & Seances
• Carl Jung: Aryan Christ: A Book Review
• Carl Jung: Psychic Pyramid Seller
• Erich Fromm: Marxist
• Freud's Absurd Homunculi
• Freud Fell Short, Scholars Find
• Freud, Fraud In Science
• Freud Was A Fraud: Triumph of Pseudoscience
• Jean-Martin Charcot: Another LYING Psychological Fraud
• John Maynard Keynes: Economic Terrorist/Saboteur: Bolshevik: Serial Child Rapist
• Marsha Linehan: Communism's Dialectic Through Buddhism
• Nazi Doctors, Moral Vulnerability And Contemporary Medical Culture
• Wilhelm Reich: Communism Generates Great, Sanity Inducing Orgasms
• Wilhelm Reich: FDA Concludes, "A Fraud Of The First Magnitude"

Prominent Video Game-Violence Researcher Loses Another Paper To Retraction,

retractionwatch

If you read this space, you probably know the name Brad Bushman. He studies the effects of violent video games on the people who play them. He also has just retracted his third paper, and significantly corrected another. 

Although Bushman remains a prominent voice in a highly contentious field — prompting numerous media to consult him after school shootings or other violent acts — he’s retracted two papers, one following an investigation at his institution, the Ohio State University (OSU), which prompted OSU to strip his co-author of her PhD. (There’s a lot more to tell about that story, including the backlash outside critics faced for taking their concerns about the paper public. To read more, check out our in-depth piece in Motherboard.)

Bushman’s third retraction came this month; he nearly had a fourth as well, but attorneys for the publisher decided that a massive correction (to a paper which previously had been flagged with an expression of concern) would be more appropriate.
The retraction notice from Current Opinion in Psychology states the paper showed too much similarity to a 2016 paper in the same journal by Bushman and Arlin James Benjamin, based at the University of Arkansas-Fort Smith. It notes that although Bushman was the guest editor of the issue of the journal:



continue reading

 

 

Thank You Retraction Watch. 

New Study Investigates The Negative Side Effects of Therapy

madinamerica
Rebecca Troeger August 15, 2018

A study led by Dr. Schermuly-Haupt of the Psychosomatic Rehabilitation Research Group at Charité University Medicine Berlin examines the prevalence of side effects for Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (CBT). The researchers, whose results were published in Cognitive Therapy and Research, found that 43% of CBT patients in their sample experienced side effects, which they define as “negative reactions to an appropriately delivered treatment.”

“Knowledge about the side effect profile [of psychotherapy] can improve early recognition of side effects, safeguard patients, and enhance therapy outcome,” the researchers write.

Researchers have long recognized that psychotherapy has positive as well as negative consequences. Estimates of side effect (SE) rates for psychotherapy vary from 5% to 20% of cases. One such side effect — deterioration of symptoms due to therapy — has been found to occur in 3 to 10% of patients. Psychological distress and marital/family conflict are two common side effects of treatment; others include the appearance of new symptoms, suicidality, stigmatization, and tension or changes in a patient’s social relationships.

Despite historical recognition of psychotherapy’s side effects, there is currently little data on their features and rate of occurrence. Dr. Schermuly-Haupt and colleagues sought to address this gap. They interviewed one hundred CBT therapists, asking them to describe “unwanted events” (UEs) experienced by a recent patient who had undergone 10 or more sessions of CBT.

Therapists were prompted to distinguish between unwanted events (i.e., any unwanted event that occurs during therapy, which may or may not be related to the therapy), adverse treatment reactions (i.e., an unwanted event related to treatment), and side effects (i.e. an unwanted event related to treatment that met “professional standards”) through the use of an Unwanted Events-Adverse Treatment Reactions Checklist, which differentiates between these treatment reaction categories.

The researchers found a curious discrepancy between the percentages of side effects identified by psychotherapists who were first asked for a “spontaneous report,” versus the percentage later identified during interviews when the various categories of unwanted events were “systematically evoke[d]” through use of the checklist. Initially, 74% of therapists stated that they didn’t know of any UEs or SEs that had occurred during treatment.

After the structured interview, however, therapists reported that 43% of patients experienced one or more SE (Average .57, SD = .81). This difference in reported side effects may point to a blind spot on the part of psychotherapists, which perhaps owes to difficulty recognizing one’s ability to harm, as well as a lack of training and awareness about psychotherapy’s adverse side effects.

The most commonly reported side effects included “negative well-being/distress,” “deterioration of symptoms,” and “strains in family relations.” According to qualitative data, examples of “negative well-being/distress” included crying uncontrollably in session, discomfort, and fear when engaging in interventions in session (e.g., exposure activities, role plays), difficulty discussing specific topics, and strong feelings experienced in response to the therapist (e.g. anger, tension, stress, and anxiety).

Examples of family strain that emerged as a result of treatment included a spouse who was distressed after his wife became less attentive and took more time for herself after being in therapy and a client who felt guilt and sadness after choosing to distance herself from a parent.

The authors note that there is some debate regarding whether “ordinary reactions” to CBT, such as the distress reactions and changes in patients’ social relationships described above, should be characterized as side effects, particularly since they may be essential to successful treatment outcomes. They argue that even though these responses “may be unavoidable, justified, or even needed or intended,” they should nevertheless be categorized as side effects. These side effects, although “unavoidable” and even “intended,” should be studied and should serve as motivation to develop treatments that “are better tolerated,” they write.

The authors also note that although the majority of the side effects identified in their study were rated as mild to moderate (59.6%) and not lasting (89.6%), over 40% of side effects were classified as severe or very severe, and 8.8% were persistent. Reflecting on these findings, they conclude, “Psychotherapy is not harmless.”

The study has several limitations. As psychotherapists reported side effects, reports may have been influenced by therapist bias; the authors suggest that future studies use a blend of stories from patients, therapists, and outside interviewers. The study’s sample was composed of patients with various diagnoses, and as such, results would likely be different in a more homogenous sample, or with a different form of therapy. Additionally, as approximately half of the patients whose cases were reported on in the study were taking psychotropic drugs, and it is thus impossible to rule out the effect of medication on the observed side effects.

The authors hope that the results of their study will increase psychotherapists’ awareness of treatment side effects and that this will contribute to improved care. In alignment with the recent call for an enhanced psychotherapy informed consent process, the authors also state that their data can be used to strengthen informed consent in psychotherapy, as well as to support “risk monitoring” throughout treatment.


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Schermuly-Haupt, M. L., Linden, M., & Rush, A. J. (2018). Unwanted Events and Side Effects in Cognitive Behavior Therapy. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 42(3), 219-229. (Link)


Thank You Ms Troeger and MIA, BUT, . . . .

With all due respect we Do realize people are trying to 'fix' this broken system.

It Can't be fixed.

Defund it, completely. Shut it down with a 6 week grace period for its practioners to Close up shop and quit the biz.

On Day One of week 7, write out the arrest warrants and indictments and round up everyone still engaged in it.

• 18C13 (1)
• 18C19 (1)
• 18C47 (1)
• 18C63 (3)
• 18C95 (4)

Prominent Researcher and Psychotherapist Questions 'Evidence - Based' Therapy.

madinamerica
Zenobia Morrill June 4, 2018

Dr. Johnathan Shedler recently published a paper critiquing how the term “evidence-based” is being used in the field of psychotherapy. He argues that “evidence-based” has come to refer to select, manualized therapies that are wrongly upheld as superior.

“The term evidence-based has come to mean something very different for psychotherapy,” Shedler writes. “It has been appropriated to promote a specific ideology and agenda. It is now used as a code word for manualized therapy—most often brief, one-size-fits-all forms of cognitive behavior therapy (CBT).”

 

 

Photo Credit: Pixabay

The term “evidence-based” was originally meant to encourage practice grounded in critical thinking, multiple forms of information, and scientific research. It was popularized in the 1990s within medical fields. However, Shedler contends that “evidence-based therapy” has taken on a new meaning within psychotherapy.
Ultimately, this shifting discourse has developed alongside what Shedler refers to as a “master narrative” in psychotherapy: that the field has evolved away from therapists practicing unproven, unscientific psychotherapy toward practicing evidence-based therapies that are proven and superior. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) has been positioned as superior to insight-oriented therapies. The media participate in denigrating relationship-based or insight-oriented therapies in a way that forwards the master narrative. Practice that deviates from the manual is painted as a rejection of science.

“Note how the language leads to a form of McCarthyism,” Shedler writes.  “Because proponents of brief, manualized therapies have appropriated the term ‘evidence-based,’ it has become nearly impossible to have an intelligent discussion about what constitutes good therapy.”

Past research has previously called CBT’s superiority into question (see MIA report) and Shedler begins his paper by outlining primary sources that contribute to a counternarrative, “that evidence-based therapies are weak treatments.”

“There is a yawning chasm between what we are told research shows and what research actually shows,” Shedler explains.

By outlining the popularly cited work of the National Institute of Mental Health’s (NIMH) 1989 study, he conveys that the misconceptions of CBT as superior treatment are not a result of data misrepresentation. Instead, they are the result of a translation error, or the failure to accurately discern research jargon from colloquial language that informs policy and practice. Specifically, Shedler describes the confusion that results from the word “significance,” and its context-dependent meaning:

“Major misunderstandings arise when researchers ‘disseminate’ research findings to patients, policymakers, and practitioners. Researchers speak of ‘significant’ treatment benefits, referring to statistical significance. Most people understandably but mistakenly take this to mean that patients get well or at least meaningfully better.”

In revisiting this 1989 NIMH study, Shedler writes he is “embarrassed” to admit that he initially assumed that the 1.2-point outcome difference between the CBT group and placebo was meaningful, only to find that this difference was not even statistically significant. How did the results of this study come to be represented so differently from the actual data? These are the questions Shedler addresses in this paper.

“It was difficult to wrap my head around the notion that widespread claims that the study provided scientific support for CBT had no basis in the actual data. This seems to be a case where the master narrative trumped the facts.”

What about recent cases? Shedler jumps to a review of a recent, randomized control trial (RCT) of CBT for depression. The findings are strikingly similar to the 1989 NIMH study: about 75% of patients did not get well. Despite the results of these two major studies, and everything in between, brief manualized treatments are continuously promoted as “evidence-based” rather than ineffective.
The support for brief manualized therapies as a treatment for panic is equally bleak, according to Shedler. Worse still are findings that consider the long-term impact, or lack thereof, of manualized therapies.

“Sadly, such information reaches few clinicians and fewer patients,” he adds. “I wonder what the public and policy makes would think if they knew these are the same treatments described publicly as ‘evidence-based,’ ‘scientifically proven,’ and ‘the gold standard.’”

In this paper, Shedler continues by addressing problematic research practices behind the studies that support manualized therapies. First, most participants or patients are not included in studies as the research requires that patients only meet criteria for one diagnosis. The findings are then practically meaningless with real-world presentations, Shedler notes.
Second, comparator treatments for CBT are “shams” writes Shedler. They are essentially “fake treatments that are intended to fail”to prop up CBT as efficacious. This is done in numerous ways. For example, researchers might recruit graduate students rather than established professionals to deliver the non-CBT treatments. In other studies featuring psychodynamic therapy for PTSD as a comparator to CBT, therapists were instructed to avoid discussing trauma.
Unfortunately, these cases are not the exception. Shedler cites a review of the literature which sought to identify studies that compared “evidence-based” therapy with an alternative, bona fide psychotherapy treatments. After sifting through the extant literature, they found only 14 studies that accomplished this, none of which demonstrated “evidence-based” therapies to be more effective.
Further, these manualized therapies are not only paradoxically considered to be evidence-based bereft of actual evidence, but studies that demonstrate evidence to support the opposite are suppressed. “Data are being hidden,” writes Shedler, which is not a new concern given well-documented publication bias. A team of researchers found that “the published benefits of CBT are exaggerated by 75% owing to publication bias,” Shedler highlights.
Shedler ends by reexamining how much the term “evidence-based has veered from its original intended purpose. “‘Evidence-based’ does not actually mean supported by evidence, it means manualized, scripted, and not psychodynamic. What does not fit the master narrative does not count.”
He writes that the newfound meaning behind the “evidence-based” hype discounts patient values and perspectives as well as clinician judgment. When patients are not appropriately informed about the potential drawbacks and benefits to different forms of treatment, they cannot exercise informed choice. Further, clinicians encouraged to adhere to manuals rather than exercise clinical judgment are limited in the degree to which they can respond to client needs.

“The narrative has become a justification for all-out attacks on traditional talk therapy—that is, therapy aimed at fostering self-examination and self-understanding in the context of an ongoing, meaningful therapy relationship.”

Shedler leaves readers with the following words of advice:
“You should not take my word for any of this—or anyone else’s word. I will leave you with 3 simple things to do to help sift truth from hyperbole. When somebody makes a claim for a treatment, any treatment, follow these 3 steps:

1. Say, ‘Show me the study.’ Ask for a reference, a citation, a PDF. Have the study put in your hands. Sometimes it does not exist.
2. If the study does exist, read it—especially the fine print.
3. Draw your own conclusions. Ask yourself: Do the actual methods and findings of the study justify the claim I heard?”

**

For a limited time, the original paper by Johnathan Shedler is available online for free: https://authors.elsevier.com/a/1W-Os,4QFJ3htz

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Shedler, J. (2018). Where Is the Evidence for “Evidence-Based” Therapy?. Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 41(2), 319-329.


Thank You Ms Morrill, Mr Shedler and MIA.

The Myth of Mental Wellness: Can We Really Improve Our "Mental Health"?

madinamerica
Lawrence Kelmenson, MD May 9, 2018

I previously showed, by process of elimination, that “mental illness” is nothing but a subjective label for coping styles that are disruptive to society (below I’ll show how this is true for various specific mental illnesses). If so then mental health, the flip side of the same mental illness coin, must be merely a subjective label for coping styles that are constructive to society. A process-of-elimination dissection of the World Health Organization’s mental health definition confirms this:

It first says that mental health is a state of well-being, but since health is a synonym for wellness, this doesn’t explain what it means. It then says that it’s the reaching of one’s potential and the ability to cope with stress. But the Parkland School Shooter attained his life goal of being a ‘professional school shooter,’ which was his way of coping with stress, yet he’s not deemed mentally healthy. So this really means: reaches one’s potential and copes in ways that are productive to society. It then restates this overtly, by saying that mental health means working and contributing to society. So that’s all it is.

Madness (psychosis) must be a concept that’s in the eye of the beholder rather than an objective reality, since we call people crazy if they disagree with our beliefs. For example, you may judge me crazy for proposing this. Belief systems (and behaviors associated with them) in one culture in one era may be judged crazy in another culture or time; this is known as cultural relativism. For example, animal sacrifice used to be normal practice, but today it would be perceived as madness.

Psychosis can’t refer to beliefs not based in reality, since most of us have such beliefs (political, philosophical, spiritual, ethical, moral, etc.). Only those that don’t adhere to any norms or customs of society, and thus only make sense to one member but are incoherent to all others, are judged to be delusional. For example, someone driving on the left side of the road will be perceived as a crazy driver in the US, but one who drives on the right side in England will be called crazy. So madness must be purely a subjective label given to those who, by coping non-conformingly, disrupt society

ADHD is also likely just an arbitrary concept, since it’s more often perceived by older parents1 and teachers2 (perhaps since they have less stamina). It’s perceived more by certain ethnicities3 and nations4 despite its ‘symptoms’ occurring equally among these,5 and also perceived more by moms than dads.

Its core criteria of aimless activity, inattention and impulsivity used to be considered aspects of normal, outgrowable childhood immaturity that we all start life with. They’re thus easily perceived in all young kids (especially if parents constantly hear: “ADHD is a common treatable disease that blocks kids from succeeding”), since they’ve not yet been raised and so are only starting to mature. Similarly, bipolar criteria (moodiness/temper) used to be viewed as normal, resolvable adolescent turmoil and are easily perceived in all teens, since they’re also still being raised and still maturing.

This explains why the youngest kids in class are the ones most often labeled.6 7 8 9 ‘Diagnosing’ is supposed to only occur when such traits are age-inappropriate, belying that they’re indeed signs of immaturity. So ADHD and bipolar disorder are just labels that can apply to all kids, whose normal traits are likely often draining and disruptive to today’s busy, tired, role-juggling teachers and parents

Sadness and anxiety are unavoidable emotions; so they’re also normal experiences. Their degree is unmeasurable, since we don’t have sadness/anxiety meters that can be objectively read. It’s thus measured subjectively (by self-report). People can easily misperceive their feelings as worse than other people’s, especially when continually bombarded by propaganda about sadness (“depression”) being a severe, disabling,under-diagnosed illness tormenting hundreds of millions. Rewards like sick role status can unconsciously condition them to exaggerate their misery. And just as people may cry on the inside yet smile on the outside due to social/financial pressure to appear happy, others may feel okay on the inside yet cry on the outside due to pressure to seem sad.

The presence of so-called depressive symptoms doesn’t imply more suffering. For example, if people withdraw and stay in bed, we’ll judge them to be very sad. But taking breaks from society after being hurt is just one way to adapt to it. So why are only those who cope this way arbitrarily perceived as depressed/ill? The only explanation is their lower social productivity. If they instead cope by throwing themselves into their job, we’ll perceive them to be happy, or mentally healthy, since they’re being socially productive.

Happiness is illusory and transient anyway; joy is felt as a result of resolving tension. As philosophers from St.Augustine10 to Rousseau11 to Eysenck12 have noted, it fades once we get used to it. The lower the low, the higher the high, and vice versa. This is known as hedonic adaptation, or the hedonic treadmill. It explains why lottery winners and paralyzing injury victims reported reverting to baseline happiness levels within months of initial elation/sadness.13 This 1978 study would have had different results if done after depression became a thing in the ‘80s — sadness due to loss or disappointment is no longer perceived as a normal reaction that one can get through in time. Its perception as a crippling affliction that forever controls one’s destiny/identity is now imbedded in our culture.

Mental health is nothing more than a concept. It’s not only not a medical field; it can’t even qualify as a science. Its domain is only value judgments, abstract ideas, and subjective perceptions. Its hypotheses are untestable. Its measurements are so arbitrary that they can be easily fudged to prove any theory. It thus belongs in the humanities, along with philosophy or ethics. Faith in it is as psychotic as any of the beliefs that it labels psychotic.

Seeing it as real involves judging people to be better off coping one way than another. This would be like proclaiming that certain types of music are good for you while others are bad for you, and pressuring outliers to seek musical health services instead of allowing ‘to each his own’. Placebos and sedatives could be prescribed with similar ‘therapeutic’ results as from mental health services.

So happiness businesses such as psych or alternative meds, cognitive therapy, self-help programs, coaching/counseling, mindfulness/holistic/nutritional healing, and shiny new cars or other items advertised as happiness-inducing, can’t really improve ‘mental wellness’. All they do is abnormalize normal human experiences, and change coping methods into ones that can increase both society’s efficiency (in the short-run) and their businesses’ profits. Since our economy is consumer-based, coping by buying happiness products and services itself helps society thrive; it may account for most U.S. purchases.

But it can’t stop life’s tensions from recurring. We are all driven to find ways to adapt — some are called ill and others healthy, but they all work in some way or else we wouldn’t use them. Mental health, like mental illness, is a myth.14 They’re two sides of the same coin, and it’s a wooden nickel.


Thank You Dr Kelmenson and MIA.